The EU’s “crises” and implications for differentiated integration between the EU and Turkey by Saatçioğlu, Beken
 1 
Beken Saatçioğlu  
Assoc. Prof. 
Department of Political Science and International Relations 




The EU’s “Crises” and Implications for Differentiated Integration between the 
EU and Turkey  
 
 
UACES 47th Annual Conference  
Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland 
4-6 September 2017 
 






Turkey’s EU accession perspective has been plagued with much difficulty and 
uncertainty throughout the history of EU-Turkey relations. Problems originating from 
Turkey and individual member-states as well as the EU as a whole have traditionally 
strained the EU-Turkey relationship. For Turkey, the lack of a consistently displayed, 
credible EU commitment to its membership along with, at times, the presence of 
expanding and politicized accession criteria have reinforced perceptions of 
discriminatory treatment by the Union and lowered belief in the EU’s sincerity 
concerning its membership. For the EU, Turkey’s degrading democratic performance 
within the context of its much-needed compliance with the Copenhagen membership 
criteria has combined with potential difficulties associated with “absorbing” Turkey 
(economically as well as politically and culturally) to feed reservations about the 
country’s accession. 
 Against the backdrop of these longstanding issues, recent years have seen a 
deterioration of the relationship. Consequently, some member-states (Austria) as well 
as Eurosceptic, populist political groups which have recently gained ground in many 
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European countries have called for ending Turkey’s already stalled membership 
negotiations maintained since 2005. In July 2017, the European Parliament reflected 
these demands in a formal resolution, calling on member-states to end Turkey’s 
effectively deadlocked accession process and shift the relations towards a new, 
cooperation-driven institutional framework. Simultaneously, academic literature has 
caught up with these developments, debating possible forms of EU-Turkey 
institutionalized cooperation which would be realistically designed outside of the 
accession process. Essentially, these debates sought to apply the theoretical concept of 
“differentiated integration” to the changing dynamics of EU-Turkey ties.  
 This paper investigates the emerging prospects for a differentiated integration 
between the EU and Turkey. In doing so, it evaluates EU-level developments that are 
increasingly pushing for cooperative, differentiated EU-Turkey interactions in lieu of 
Turkish accession. Two specific arguments are advanced. First, the paper argues that 
“discriminatory differentiation” (a form of differentiated integration vis-à-vis third 
countries) is not new, having historically affected the EU’s policy concerning the 
contentious issue of Turkish membership. Second, it claims that the EU’s recent 
“crises” challenging European integration itself have shifted its focus away from 
enlargement and led to a primarily strategic European approach regarding Turkey. 
Europe’s 2015 Syrian “refugee crisis” has been particularly critical in this regard, 
effectively culminating in EU efforts for a “strategic partnership” with Turkey 
embedded in the notion of differentiated integration.  
 The paper begins with assessing the hypotheses on differentiated integration as 
theorized in the broader EU literature. It then briefly reviews EU-Turkey relations to 
historically trace the dynamics of discriminatory differentiation. Upon discussing the 
EU’s crises as a game changer for enlargement and EU foreign policy at large, it 
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demonstrates Turkey’s rising strategic value for Europe and resulting increased EU 
preference for a strategic partnership with it. It concludes by assessing the 
reverberations of the move towards differentiated integration in Ankara and offering 
reflections as to the possible institutional form the relationship may take in the years to 
come. 
Assessing Differentiated Integration 
 
Differentiated integration has long been a core feature of the EU, with member-states 
such as the UK exercising opt-outs in policy areas like the EMU, Schengen and/or EU 
defense policy. Over the years, the concept has become all the more relevant in parallel 
to the EU’s unprecedented widening and deepening. As the EU grew in the 2000s, so 
did the heterogeneity of member-states’ preferences with respect to the various policy 
sectors they would or could integrate in. New member-states’ differentiated pace for 
fully implementing the acquis and catching up with the old members necessitated 
transitory arrangements upon accession. Yet, technical, capacity-related member-state 
divergences were not the only factors practically enhancing differentiated integration. 
Ideological contestation of the EU’s constitutive democratic norms and values further 
widened the distance between certain Eastern member-states (i.e., Hungary and Poland) 
and the EU’s core, which was openly justified by these states’ leaders based on national 
identity and sovereignty concerns (EUObserver, 2017). With Brexit passed in 
referendum in June 2016 and rising Eurosceptic populism in even core member-states 
like France, Germany and the Netherlands, disintegrative trends reached their peak.  
 These developments undoubtedly challenged the historical European project and 
renewed debates about differentiated integration, previously also termed as “Europe a 
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la carte”, “multispeed Europe” or “variable geometry Europe”.1 In a March 2017 White 
Paper, the European Commission included differentiated integration among the various 
scenarios for the EU’s future (projected for the year 2025) (European Commission, 
2017), following a 2014 European Council decision which had acknowledged 
“different paths of integration for different countries, allowing those that want to 
deepen integration to move ahead, while respecting the wish of those who do not want 
to deepen any further” (European Council, 2014, p. 11).  
 It was against this background that differentiated integration gained popularity in 
the scholarly literature both as a general concept in need of theorization and an 
institutional framework calling for precision within the context of the EU’s varying 
relations with member-states as well as third countries. Principally, Schimmelfennig, 
Leuffen and Rittberger (2015) have explained the EU’s development as “a system of 
differentiated integration”, defined as “one Europe with a single organizational and 
member state core and a territorial extension that varies by function [emphasis in 
original]” (p. 767). In particular, differentiated integration was theorized as an 
“institutional response” to the rising diversity of member-state preferences following 
from the EU’s widening and deepening (Schimmelfennig and Winzen, 2017, p. 241; 
Schimmelfennig, 2014, p. 683). As illustrated by the EU’s relations with the new 
member-states in Central and Eastern Europe, the process correlates with these states’ 
capacity to integrate (Schimmelfennig and Winzen, 2017). Low levels of wealth have 
pushed these countries towards integration - albeit being differentiated - as they could 
not afford to stay out of the EU, which thus trumped willingness issues (identity- and 
sovereignty- related concerns) along the way (Ibid.). One major consequence of this 
                                                        
1 For a review of these paradigms of differentiated integration, see, inter alia, Karakaş (2013, p. 1062-
1064).  
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has been what Schimmelfennig and Winzen term “discriminatory differentiation” 
which excludes the poor, new member-states - lacking bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
EU - from certain rights and benefits of EU membership (e.g., free movement of labor, 
integration into the Eurozone or Schengen area, agricultural subsidies, structural funds 
etc.) during the initial phases of integration following their EU accession.  
 When hypothesized as the EU’s differential relations with both its existing 
member-states (old and new) and third countries, two factors have been found relevant 
for explaining the emergence of differential integration: interdependence and 
politicization (Schimmelfennig, Leuffen and Rittberger, 2015). Hence, external 
differentiation (differentiated integration between the EU and non-EU countries) is 
expected to occur when there is high policy interdependence between the EU and a 
third country, and yet, membership is not likely given integration’s high politicization 
in the home country (Ibid.).  
 Assessed against this backdrop, Turkey’s relations with the EU provide a perfect 
case for external differentiated integration but one which at best hinges towards 
discriminatory differentiation. Both broader EU-level trends highlighted above and the 
specific dynamics guiding Turkey-EU interactions  (Turkey’s low wealth, 
interdependence, politicization of Turkey’s membership) render this a plausible 
outcome. In a differentiated yet discriminatory arrangement, Turkey would have close 
cooperation with the EU in those policy sectors of mutual interest while being excluded 
from visa liberalization, freedom of movement of labor, structural and regional funds, 
and agricultural subsidies, as formerly signaled by the 2005 Negotiating Framework. 
Indeed, discriminatory differentiation is not new to EU-Turkey relations as it was 
fundamental even when the country’s accession prospect seemed at its best (i.e., when 
the EU decided to open accession negotiations in 2004).  
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Taking Stock of “Discriminatory Differentiation” in EU-Turkey Relations  
Discriminatory differentiation has affected the EU’s relations with Turkey from the 
outset. The seeds of this policy were sown with the EU-Turkey Association (Ankara) 
Agreement of 1963. Although the Agreement’s Article 282 acknowledged Turkey’s 
eligibility for full EU membership – contingent on its fulfillment of its obligations 
following from the agreement -, the European Community’s policy priority was 
Turkey’s economic integration which would be finalized by an EU-Turkey Customs 
Union as foreseen by the various stages of the association arrangement between the two 
sides. To this end, the Community sought to further economic cooperation with Turkey, 
a committed NATO ally which was already a valuable strategic partner within the 
context of the Cold War. This “functional” approach to Turkey defined the EU’s 
interactions with it during much of the 1980s and 1990s when Turkey continued to 
prove its strategic relevance with its young neoliberal economy and mostly pro-Western 
foreign policy.3 
 Officially, the EU’s prioritization of functional cooperation over Turkish 
accession was justified on the grounds that Turkey was far from meeting the Union’s 
democratic norms and later, the formal Copenhagen political criteria. This was, for 
example, one of the principal factors that the European Commission cited when 
rejecting Turkey’s membership application in a 1989 Avis. Instead, the Commission 
recommended measures geared towards “increased interdependence and integration” 
between Turkey and the Community, which included “completion of the customs 
                                                        
2 The original Article 28 read: “As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to 
justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the 
Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the 
Community”. 
3 For a detailed historical overview of Turkey-EU relations in the areas of the economy, security and 
foreign policy, see, Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci (2015).  
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union, the resumption and intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of 
industrial and technological cooperation, and the strengthening of political and cultural 
links” (European Commission, 1989, p. 8).  
 This cooperation-driven rationale dominated subsequent EU policy and discourse 
vis-à-vis Turkey through the 1990s. The “European Strategy” that was launched by the 
December 1997 Luxembourg European Council in order to make up for denying 
Turkey official EU candidacy status explicitly demonstrated the EU’s penchant for a 
functional, differentiated integration to be accomplished between Turkey and the EU. 
In addition to the measures suggested in the Commission’s 1989 Avis, the Strategy 
included the “approximation of laws and adoption of the Union acquis [and Turkey’s] 
participation, to be decided case by case, in certain programmes and certain agencies” 
(European Council, 1997, paragraph 32).  
 In the period before Turkish EU candidacy (December 1999), this emphasis on 
cooperation (in lieu of Turkey’s full EU membership) was expected from the EU’s part 
since the official accession process had not yet started and Turkey had not yet embarked 
on political reforms. However, European preference for Turkey’s integration short of 
EU accession persisted even in the post-candidacy period and, increasingly, following 
EU-Turkey accession negotiations beginning in 2005. Indeed, Turkey’s accession has 
always been the most politically contested among all the other EU applicants. Such 
contestation consistently translated into Turkey being treated as a “special case” by the 
EU despite official EU rhetoric recognizing that Turkey is “destined to join the Union 
on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States” (European 
Council, 1999, paragraph 12). Hence, Turkey was placed firmly behind the other 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in the accession queue (which was 
also debatable since some CEECs were not too far ahead of Turkey in their EU 
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compliance given their ongoing post-communist transition at the time). It also faced 
continuously expanding and politicized membership criteria (Saatçioğlu, 2009) that it 
often contested (e.g., the EU’s Cyprus condition unilaterally imposed on Turkey as 
opposed to also being made a criterion for Greece or Cyprus; EU absorption capacity) 
even when it was on a reform track.  
 Politicization even infiltrated Turkey’s eventual advancement in the accession 
process as the latter was not objectively or sufficiently driven by the country’s own 
compliance record. Rather, decisions such as candidacy and the opening of accession 
negotiations were only made possible as a result of changing political circumstances in 
key member-states turning the tide in Turkey’s favor and/or intra-EU political 
bargaining over Turkey’s negotiation terms lowering the costs of a potential Turkish 
accession for the EU – however unlikely the latter seemed (Saatçioğlu, 2012).  
 Preference for an institutional arrangement in the form of discriminatory 
differentiation was nowhere more evident than in the Negotiating Framework setting 
the terms of EU-Turkey accession talks for the years to come. The Framework not only 
alluded to “privileged partnership” as a legitimized alternative possibly tying Turkey 
to the EU but also specified exceptionally harsh conditions under which Turkey would 
be integrated in the EU. As such, it was announced that Turkey could be “fully anchored 
in the European structures through the strongest possible bond” (European Council, 
2005, p. 5) in the event of non-membership and “long transitional periods, derogations, 
specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses” could apply to key “areas such 
as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture” in all likelihood 
(Ibid., p. 10). 
 The terms of the Negotiating Framework closely reflected the preferences of 
center-right, European politicians who openly opposed Turkey’s accession on cultural 
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and political grounds. Among them, the position of Austria was pivotal since it agreed 
to the opening of accession talks with Turkey in return for the EU’s acquiescence to 
launch parallel talks with Croatia and only after the Framework’s harsh terms were 
established. More bluntly, representing the German Christian Democrats, Angela 
Merkel notably stated in 2004 that “a Europe with Turkey as a fully-fledged member 
would not be a Europe that is fully integrated” (Hürsoy, 2017, p. 4).  
 These exclusionary preferences later made their way to the accession negotiations 
as European leaders did not hesitate to veto the opening of individual chapters with 
Turkey. This was particularly the case with former French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
who vetoed the opening of five accession chapters in 2007 on the grounds that they 
were most directly related with Turkey’s membership (Phinnemore and İçener, 2016, 
p. 453). In 2009, Cyprus vetoed another six chapters which critically included Chapters 
23 (“Judiciary and Fundamental Rights”) and 24 (“Justice, Freedom and Security”), 
thus partially blocking Turkey’s chances of making progress on the democracy and rule 
of law fronts which are so critical for furthering its accession. When compared to the 
negotiations led by CEECs, the vetoes exercised by France and Cyprus clearly indicated 
that “Turkish negotiations are highly political” (Müftüler-Baç, 2017, p. 8).  
 The impact of these political hurdles was multiplied by other difficulties linked 
with Greek Cyprus’ 2004 EU accession, which directly bore upon Turkey’s 
negotiations. Relatedly, Turkey’s refusal to extend the Ankara Agreement’s Additional 
Protocol (i.e., the 1995 EU-Turkey customs union) to new member-state Cyprus 
effectively meant that Turkish ports and airports remained closed to Greek Cypriot 
access, prompting the European Council in December 2006 to veto the opening of eight 
related negotiation chapters while deciding that no other chapter would be provisionally 
closed unless Turkey complied.  
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 The net effect of these developments was that during the course of its accession 
negotiations since 2005, Turkey was able to provisionally close only one chapter 
(“Science and Research”, June 2006) and open 16 out of the remaining 20 chapters 
which were not subject to a veto. Compared to the other EU candidates,4 Turkey’s 
negotiations so far moved at a snail’s pace, making the country “‘an anomaly’ in EU’s 
widening process” (Turhan, 2017, p. 2).  
 Clearly, Turkey has been a special, sui generis case for the EU throughout its 
relations with it. Although steps such as candidacy and the opening of membership 
negotiations technically – albeit slowly - moved the accession process forward, in 
reality, discriminatory impulses have proven decisive. On the one hand, unlike the 
CEECs “returning to Europe”, Turkey was never seen as belonging to the “European 
family”; it was primarily treated by the EU with a strategic rationale (Yenel, 2017, p. 
32). On the other, and largely relatedly, it traditionally drew high and rising opposition 
to its membership from European publics, especially in member-states with large 
numbers of Turkish immigrants (e.g., Germany, Austria, the Netherlands). Not 
surprisingly, such low levels of support translated into many European governments 
(e.g., Austria, Germany, France)’ “sceptical if not hostile positions towards Turkish 
accession” (Phinnemore and İçener, 2016, p. 455). Consequently, although official EU 
rhetoric continued to honor Turkey’s EU accession perspective based on the principle 
of pacta sund servanda, alternative differentiated integration arrangements such as 
privileged partnership during 2002-2005 (Karakaş, 2013, p. 1067) or, more recently, 
“special partnership”, figured prominently in Europe. This contradiction, which some 
have rightly labeled as the EU’s “Janus-faced” policy towards Turkey (Hürsoy, 2017), 
                                                        
4 Notably, Croatia began accession negotiations on the same date as Turkey, closed them in 2011 and 
acceded to the EU in 2013.  
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has grown in recent years in parallel to Turkey’s rising strategic significance for the EU 
(i.e., within the context of the refugee crisis) notwithstanding its mounting illiberalism. 
When it comes to the pressing question of “what to do with Turkey”, many European 
capitals now seem to be guided by a “‘politics of pretending’, where the process [of 
membership negotiations] is kept alive only because nobody wants to take 
responsibility for finally bringing it to an end” (Alaranta, 2016, p. 7).  
The EU’s Crises and Turkey’s Rising Strategic Value   
 In recent years, the multiple “crises” that the EU had to deal with – “the [2010] 
Eurozone crisis, [the refugee crisis], the rise of populist Euroscepticism, the implosion 
of the Middle East, Russia’s assertiveness in the east, escalating jihadi terrorism and 
Brexit” (Tocci, 2017a, p. 496) - have reasonably shifted its policy priorities. As the EU 
went through “its most sustained and testing period of crisis” during the last decade, 
even the sustainability of European integration became the subject of scholarly debate 
(Phinnemore, 2015).  
 The EU itself recognized these challenges and came forward with a new Global 
Strategy (EUGS) which was announced in June 2016, in parallel to the Brexit 
referendum. As the Strategy put it bluntly:  
 We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. 
 Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought 
 unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned (EU 
 HR/VP, 2016, p. 7).  
 
 Consequently, the new EUGS prioritized “protecting Europe itself” as opposed 
to pursuing goals such as Europeanization vis-à-vis third countries (Tocci, 2017a, p. 
498). As such, it was a realistic readjustment of the EU’s former, 2003 Security Strategy 
(European Security Strategy) which had optimistically geared EU foreign policy 
towards the promotion of democratic values in enlargement and neighboring countries 
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in a global order where transition towards democracy and neoliberalism proved 
relatively unchallenged (Ibid., p. 497).  
 These inward-looking evaluations not only refocused the EU’s policy priorities 
for the future but also practically mirrored and reinforced some already existing trends 
in EU foreign policy. Turkey’s evolving ties with the EU cannot to be assessed in 
isolation from this broader European approach which increasingly plays itself out in the 
Union’s foreign relations. First, enlargement is no longer a priority of the EU, which, 
from a technical standpoint (and in the best possible likelihood), brings to the fore 
institutional alternatives like differentiated integration. With Croatia’s accession, it 
“has reached its limits in 2013” and accession negotiations have been pursued at a slow 
pace not only with Turkey but also the other EU candidates in the Western Balkans 
(Müftüler-Baç, 2017, p. 3). In a sense, notwithstanding these countries’ difficulties in 
meeting the EU accession criteria, the pause in enlargement echoes the then incoming 
Commission President Juncker’s famous 2014 announcement delaying enlargement 
until 2019 in view of the Union’s need to “digest the addition of 13 member states in 
the past 10 years”.5 In addition and more ideologically, the absence of an “enlargement 
narrative” similar to the once popular frame of “uniting Europe” which provided the 
Union’s “raison d’être” during the 1990s when post-communist EU candidates were 
“returning to Europe” (Phinnemore and Içener, 2016, p. 457-458), has also weakened 
the Union’s enlargement zeal.  
 Second, in dealing with the above challenges and crises, the EU has noticeably 
turned inward and “retreated from its democracy support role over the course of 2016” 
in its neighborhood (Pomorska and Noutcheva, 2017, p. 8). “Acting strategically and 
securing its own interests [as opposed to] playing it normatively and standing up for its 
                                                        
5 See Juncker’s policy priorities envisaged for his term, discussed at: http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities.  
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values” guided EU foreign policy as the Union struggled to resolve crises occurring in 
the European periphery, notably, the refugee crisis (Ibid., p. 5) Consequently, the Union 
often turned a blind eye to democracy problems in the Western Balkans and Turkey for 
the sake of securing these regimes’ cooperation in stopping the refugee flows to Europe 
(Ibid., p. 5).  
 These ongoing developments in EU external action as assessed and embedded by 
the latest EU Strategy, inevitably fed into EU-Turkey relations and reinforced the 
historical trend toward differentiated integration. On the one hand, the EU seems to 
have retreated from its democratic anchor role vis-à-vis Turkey, as most explicitly 
demonstrated by its refugee deals with Ankara where conditionality has been applied 
rather softly in order to secure the latter’s cooperation. At the time of this writing, apart 
from the European Parliament’s July 2017 resolution recommending the suspension of 
accession negotiations with Turkey and the German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel’s 
more recent calls to take concrete action against Turkey - i.e., in the form of ending 
Commission-led preparations for the modernization of the EU-Turkey customs union 
as well as halting EU aid to Turkey and increasing financial pressure on Ankara on a 
bilateral basis (Euractiv, 2017) - , the Union’s attitude regarding Ankara has remained 
at the level of mere verbal criticism. Moreover, the criticism has been rather muted or 
postponed when the EU needs Turkey for strategic reasons, such as was the case during 
the making of the refugee deals. This soft European approach does not bode well for 
restoring Turkey’s democratic commitment and by extension, chances of EU 
membership as it emboldens the Turkish government to maintain its authoritarian 
stance. As a result, so long as the EU benefits from functional cooperation with Ankara 
and prioritizes strategic interests over democratic values, a differentiated integration 
arrangement with Brussels seems to be Turkey’s best bet.  
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 On the other hand, there is an increasing political tendency within European 
circles to treat Turkey as a “strategic partner” rather than engage with it as a serious EU 
candidate. Although Turkey’s ongoing authoritarian drift has no doubt contributed to 
this perception, it was the refugee crisis which provided the opportunity for a re-shaping 
of ties with Turkey by bringing to the fore the EU’s strategic dependence on Turkey. 
This dependence, along with the long-standing politicization of Turkey’s membership 
both in Turkey and Europe, created the conditions for resetting the EU-Turkey 
relationship (as hypothesized by Schimmelfennig et al., discussed above). Hence, the 
EU-Turkey agreements of 2015 and 2016 effectively downgraded Turkey’s status from 
accession country to strategic partner and cleared the way for a new, differentiated 
cooperative relationship where the two sides can closely cooperate over mutually 
beneficial areas.  
The EU’s Refugee Crisis: A Moment of Opportunity for a Strategic Partnership 
between the EU and Turkey  
 
 The unprecedented flow of Syrian refugees to Europe in 2015 led to a strategic 
rapprochement between the EU and Turkey (Saatçioğlu, 2016). As the EU was unable 
to apply a “European solution” (i.e., a solution built around relevant EU principles such 
as “solidarity” and “fair sharing of responsibility” among the member-states)6 to this 
growing challenge in the fall of 2015, it felt constrained to seek Turkey’s cooperation 
for externalizing the crisis on the basis of its strategic interests. Consequently, largely 
under the initiative of the German government, the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan was 
adopted in October 2015, forming the basis of two subsequent cooperative agreements 
reached on 29 November 2015 and 18 March 2016, respectively. With these 
arrangements, in exchange for agreeing to stop the flow of refugees to Europe via 
                                                        
6 As explicitly stated in the EU’s Lisbon Treaty: “The [asylum and immigration] policies of the Union 
... and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States” (Lisbon Treaty, Art. 80).  
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Turkish soil and hosting them in Turkey, Ankara was promised EU financial aid (geared 
towards covering hosted refugees’ needs), “re-energized” EU-Turkey accession talks, 
and more notably, the conditional prospect of visa liberalization for Turkish citizens in 
the Schengen area.  
 As far as the broader EU-Turkey relationship is concerned, the deals suggested 
that a new format of relations, which would be crafted outside of the framework of 
accession negotiations, is in the making (Turhan, 2017, p. 4). On the one hand, 
substantively speaking, the EU-Turkey Statement of 29 November 2015 heralded the 
primacy of strategic interdependence and cooperation in multiple areas ranging from 
migration to the economy (via the modernization of the EU-Turkey customs union), 
energy and counter-terrorism.7 On the other, it was decided that “a structured and more 
frequent high-level dialogue” consisting of regular EU-Turkey summits (to be held 
twice a year) would provide a “platform to assess the development of Turkey-EU 
relations” and discuss issues of mutual concern (European Council, 2015a). This 
institutionalization of bilateral summits between the EU and a candidate country 
(Turkey) proved significant not only because it constituted the first of its kind in the 
EU’s enlargement history but also because it established an alternative, preferred 
avenue for EU-Turkey interactions in comparison to longstanding yet ineffective 
mechanisms such as the EU-Turkey Association Council (Müftüler-Baç, 2017, p. 17-
18). As Müftüler-Baç rightly points out: “... The bilateral summit indicates that 
Turkey’s relations with the EU stepped out of the traditional EU negotiations strategy 
in its enlargement policy, and indicate a new pattern of a differentiated integration 
between the EU and Turkey” (Ibid., p. 18).  
                                                        
7 For a detailed analysis of these individual areas of EU-Turkey cooperation, see, Müftüler-Baç (2017).  
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 At a broader level, a closer look at the EU’s decisions and statements on Turkey 
in the aftermath of the refugee crisis reveals EU officials’ and member-states’ 
(represented by the Council) growing prioritization of strategic, differentiated ties with 
Ankara over the official aim of Turkish accession. Although a full discourse analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it should nonetheless be noted that a generally strategic 
tone emanates from the EU’s signals in this period. In a way, the tone was set at the 
outset by European Council President Donald Tusk when launching the November 
2015 EU-Turkey deal: “Turkey remains a strategic partner for Europe, but also a 
candidate country of the EU” (European Council, 2015b). By the end of 2016, the 
Commission’s Progress Report on Turkey opened with the sentence: “Turkey remains 
a key partner for the European Union”, and underlined enhanced EU-Turkey 
“cooperation in the areas of joint interest, which support and complement the accession 
negotiations” (European Commission, 2016, p. 4). While former Commission reports 
had also evaluated functional relations between Ankara and Brussels in addition to the 
former’s progress towards accession, the 2016 report became the first to put this much 
emphasis on EU-Turkey “partnership”. In the same vein, the December 2016 EU 
General Affairs Council labeled Turkey “a candidate country and a key partner for the 
Union” and underscored the EU’s commitment to working together with it “for the 
mutual benefits of our longstanding cooperation in many important fields” (European 
Council, 2016, p. 9). Significantly, even the openly critical European Parliament – in 
its July 2017 recommendation to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey in view 
of Ankara’s anti-democratic constitutional reform package passed in April 2017 – 
“[s]tressed the strategic importance of good Turkey-EU relations” (European 
Parliament, 2017, point 3) and called “for the deepening of ... relations in key areas of 
joint interest, such as counter-terrorism, migration, energy, the economy and trade”, 
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emphasizing that it would be “an investment in the stability and prosperity of both 
Turkey and the EU” (Ibid., point 20).  
 The EU’s “strategic-ness” vis-à-vis Turkey also revealed itself in its soft 
application of democratic membership conditionality in the period leading up to the 
refugee deals, as mentionned above. The making of the deals necessitated frequent, 
high-level visits between Turkey and Brussels as well as individual member-state 
leaders (notably, German Chancellor Angela Merkel). During their contacts and 
negotiations with Ankara, European representatives toned down their democratic 
criticisms of Turkey, at a time when the country’s democratic backsliding was 
proceeding in full speed, which was documented – ironically so - by increasingly 
critical Commission progress reports. As bluntly admitted by Commission President 
Jean Claude Juncker on the eve of the November 2015 deal:  
 We can say that EU and the European institutions have outstanding issues with 
 Turkey on human rights, press freedoms and so on. We can harp on about that 
 but where is that going to take us in our discussions with Turkey?… We want to 
 ensure that no more refugees come from Turkey into the European Union (The 
 Telegraph, 2015).  
  
 Similarly, when Merkel visited Turkey in October 2015 to negotiate the details 
of the refugee deal with Ankara (thus giving the illiberal Turkish government important 
political ground to capitalize on before Turkey’s November 1 parliamentary elections), 
she de-emphasized Turkey’s democracy problems and expressed support for re-
energized EU-Turkey talks. As the representative of the lead EU member-state during 
the management of the refugee crisis, her change of tone proved significant not only 
because it contrasted with her more opposing, pre-crisis stance concerning Ankara’s 
democratic violations, but also because it signaled that the EU is willing to put 
democratic values on the back burner if doing so is strategically indispensable.  
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 More concretely, to secure Turkey’s cooperation with the crisis, the EU did not 
shy away from offering Ankara certain political concessions, all pointing to a softer 
application of conditionality. For example, the Commission postponed the publication 
of its 2015 progress report (one of its most critical reports to date) until after Turkey’s 
November elections, eventually issuing it on 10 November 2015. The European 
Parliament was the only EU institution which criticized the move, arguing that it “was 
a wrong decision, as it gave the impression that the EU is willing to go silent on 
violations of fundamental rights in return for the Turkish Government’s cooperation on 
refugees” (European Parliament, 2016). Similar criticisms were raised by observers of 
EU-Turkey relations in relation to the EU’s opening of Chapter 17 (Economic and 
Monetary Policy) to negotiations in December 2015: “[O]pening a chapter now - and a 
chapter that is not directly related to human rights issues - signals to a radiant [Turkish 
Prime Minister] Davutoğlu that EU norms are up for grabs” (Bechev and Tocci, 2015).  
 In short, the EU’s strategic approach to Turkey as it handled the refugee crisis 
revealed a progressive trend toward a new type of functional relationship between 
Ankara and Brussels. Indeed, the deals with Turkey were finalized in the spirit of the 
Union’s strategic partnerships and/or dealings with other countries in its neighborhood 
(e.g., Libya), which have similarly been achieved and maintained in disregard for these 
regimes’ democratic commitment. More interestingly, it could be argued that the period 
surrounding the making of these agreements bears striking resemblance to the 1990s 
when the EU maintained (and favored) a relationship of association with Turkey while 
not using formal accession conditionality which had not yet come to fruition in relation 
to either Ankara or more generally, the CEECs. With Turkey’s April 2017 adoption of 
a constitutional reform package establishing a fully empowered, executive presidency 
via abolishing separation of powers and the rule of law, European political tendency 
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towards functional, differentiated integration has grown in parallel with European 
debates on whether the EU should cut accession negotiations with Ankara.  
Quo Vadis EU-Turkey? Towards a new Institutional Framework for a Strategic 
Partnership  
 
 Recent EU-level political developments discussed above have combined with 
Turkey’s authoritarian drift to solidify European perceptions that Turkey’s EU 
membership perspective is no longer tenable and therefore, designing an alternative 
form of EU-Turkey relationship (which is already in the making following the refugee 
crisis) is a more realistic target for the future. Although member-states are so far 
unwilling to formally end accession negotiations with Turkey (to the exception of 
Austria, and recently, critical voices from the German government represented by 
Sigmar Gabriel, suggesting to cut EU pre-accession funds to Turkey, a move which 
would be tantamount to halting Turkey’s accession process 8 ), there is little 
disagreement regarding Turkey’s new positioning vis-à-vis the EU as a strategic partner 
rather than a serious EU candidate.  
 Against this backdrop, the need to formulate a new institutional format for EU-
Turkey relations has recently been acknowledged at the highest political level within 
the EU. In the aftermath of Turkey’s controversial constitutional referendum, EU 
Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations 
Johannes Hahn noted that “the current situation [between the EU and Turkey] is not 
sustainable” and called on the member-states to consider a new format for relations 
with Turkey which would be geared towards enhancing mutual cooperation (Reuters, 
2017). The latest EU-Turkey High Level Political Dialogue held in Brussels on 25 July 
2017 fell short of debating such an institutional alternative, yet underscored  - in the 
                                                        
8  For a comprehensive analysis of bilateral tensions between Germany and Turkey which have 
contributed to this outcome, see, Eppel (2017), and Hauge (2017).  
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spirit of former EU statements mentioned above - that “Turkey is at the same time a 
candidate country and a strategic partner for the European Union”.9 Specifically, as 
Mogherini reported, the meeting “discussed [EU-Turkey] cooperation in the fields of 
energy, security, countering terrorism, migration management, ... economic and trade 
relations, but also transport and agriculture” while stressing that such cooperation needs 
to be “sustained by [Turkey’s] concrete, positive steps in the areas of rule of law and 
fundamental freedoms” (Ibid.).  
 Turkey’s reaction to these developments has been ambivalent at best, as it has 
been shaped by the Turkish government’s politicized stance on the question of EU 
membership. Although the government maintains its official commitment to EU 
accession, its representatives’ tone regarding relations has politically alternated 
between indifference concerning membership – fed by an occasionally expressed sense 
of Turkish moral superiority vis-à-vis the EU and/or resentment and mistrust caused by 
the EU’s longstanding double standards towards Ankara - and animosity expressed via 
hostile remarks directed at individual member-states.10 Which reaction gains the upper 
hand has been driven by domestic political developments and the government’s 
political calculations in a country where EU membership is no longer as popular as it 
once was.11 As admitted in a July 2017 interview by Erdoğan: “If the EU, bluntly says, 
‘We will not be able to accept Turkey into the EU’ this will be comforting for us ... The 
                                                        
9  “Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the press conference 
following the EU-Turkey High Level Political Dialogue”, available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/30391/eu-turkey-high-level-political-
dialogue_en. 
10  This was the case, most notably, when Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan boldly accused the 
Netherlands and Germany of being “Nazi remnants” and displaying “fascist actions” when these 
governments banned Turkish political campaign rallies (planned in support for Turkey’s anti-democratic 
April 2017 constitutional package) from taking place in their countries (The Independent, 2017).  
11 A 2017 national survey has found that only 48.4% of the Turkish public supports Turkey’s EU 
membership (in comparison to the relatively high support which remained over 70% in 2005) while an 
increasing percentage, - by 14.6% compared to 2016 -, 81.3% thinks that Turkey will never join the EU 
(Akgül Açıkmeşe, 2017).  
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European Union is not indispensable for us... We are relaxed” (BBC, 2017). Noting 
that the majority of Turks did not “want the EU anymore” and considered its approach 
to Turkey “insincere”, he added: “Despite all this we will continue being sincere with 
the EU for a little more time” (Ibid.). 
 Clearly, at the present political juncture, the Turkish government officially 
remains intent on paying lip service to the goal of EU accession as it does not want to 
be the side that abandons the deadlocked EU accession process. This was firmly stated 
by Turkey’s EU Affairs Minister Ömer Çelik: “We reject with the back of our hand any 
proposals that there should be strong cooperation between Turkey and the EU in other 
areas instead of accession talks” (Middle East Observer, 2017). In reality, however, 
there is an increasing preference among the Turkish leadership for “reshaping the 
relationship away from the political conditionality inherent in accession, toward a more 
‘transactional’ framework focused on trade, economic and security collaboration” 
(FEUTURE, 2017). This is evident in the government’s intransigence not to restore 
Turkish democracy and rule of law framework despite the EU’s ongoing criticisms. It 
is also apparent in Ankara’s overwhelming interests (i.e., in comparison to the EU’s 
gains from upgrading relations with Turkey) in boosting and institutionalizing 
cooperation with the EU via, most concretely, modernizing the 1995 customs union 
arrangement (Ülgen, 2017, p. 2-6).  
 What form the new EU-Turkey relationship will take is an open question which 
is beyond the scope of this paper and has been extensively discussed elsewhere 
(Karakaş, 2013; Hürsoy, 2017; Turhan, 2017; Müftüler-Baç, 2017). Suffice it to say 
that the emerging “strategic partnership” will need to be institutionally structured and 
customized to capture the specific dynamics of EU-Turkey relations, both in the present 
time and against the historical backdrop. Alternative models of differentiated 
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integration such as privileged partnership, extended associated membership (EAM), the 
European Economic Area (EEA) or the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) would be 
of limited guidance in this endeavor. Indeed, the first two have already been rejected 
by the Turkish government (Karakas, 2013) while the latter two would not be feasible 
for Turkey as they include existing member-states or non-member European countries 
(i.e., Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Lichtenstein) with an already well-functioning rule 
of law framework which is indispensable for maintaining reliable economic relations. 
Hence, it appears that a new institutional framework will need to be invented, and as 
Hahn admitted, “[the EU] probably [has] to be creative on this” (RFE/RL, 2017).   
Conclusion  
This paper has analyzed the evolving nature of the EU-Turkey relationship against the 
backdrop of EU-level developments which have come to bear on it in recent years. 
Focusing on the concept of differentiated integration, and more specifically, 
discriminatory differentiation, it has argued that this relational framework has 
historically been influential in the case of EU-Turkey relations. Although both the EU 
and Turkey kept their official commitment to accession throughout the years, the signs 
for an alternative form of relationship were always there, given the difficulties 
involving Turkish membership for both sides and European contestation vis-à-vis 
Turkey’s EU candidacy. 
 Yet, the trend toward differentiated integration has never been more pronounced. 
The EU’s multiple crises since 2010, and principally, its management of the refugee 
crisis since 2015, have placed EU strategy at the center of EU-Turkey relations. 
Effectively, Turkey has been perceived and treated as a strategic partner in European 
circles while its formal candidate status has not been officially dropped from the 
agenda.  
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 Given these developments, a new institutional format capturing the relations’ 
changing dynamics is in order. In realizing this daunting task, both the EU and Turkey 
would benefit from remembering their relations’ historically sui generis nature. Turkey 
is the one EU candidate with the longest accession history, and if negotiations are 
eventually ended, it will be the only country failing to complete its accession talks 
despite having been subject to rigorous membership and acquis conditionality. Hence, 
at least from a normative standpoint, such a historical legacy demands the formulation 
of a relationship which, while being moved outside the accession framework, would 
still be norm-based. Such an institutional alternative would not only help Turkey’s dire 
democratic prospects (Tocci, 2017b; Aydın-Düzgit, 2017) but would also be legitimate 
considering its fit with “normative power Europe” as well as the EU’s express need to 
respect “principles” while pursuing “pragmatic” foreign policy (i.e., “principled 
pragmatism”) as announced by the latest EU Global Strategy (Tocci, 2017a). Last but 
not least, it may also be indispensable from a purely practical perspective, i.e., when it 
comes to ensuring the smooth functioning of a potentially upgraded Customs Union 
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